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Abstract
Investigators and members of the National Transportation Safety Board attribute the cause of
the majority of airline accidents and incidents to pilot error. In an effort to address this problem,
many airlines have developed training programs for pilots aimed at Improving teamwork and
decision making in the cockpit. Much of this training, generally termed Cockpit Resource
Management (CRM), has leadership style assessment and modification through group exercise
as its foundation. Though cockpit resource management training has been widely embraced
within the aviation industry, its effectiveness in improving flight safety has yet to be demonstrated.
An argument is advanced that the current approach to this training is not likely to be effective.
Other approaches are suggested.
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the jet age in 1958,
commercial air travel accident rates began a
precipitous decline (Sears, 1989), but by the
early 1970s the decline leveled off and has
remained low but nearly constant. Because of
jet aircraft systems' reliability and redundancy,
accidents due primarily to mechanical failure
are rare. The human system failure, the pilot, is
the causal factor in more than seventy percent
of commercial airline accidents (Lautman and
Gallimore, 1987).
Researchers at the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), in the early
1970's, began studying approaches to effect
further improvements in airline safety and
concluded that the root causes of pilot error
accidents must be addressed if the accident
rate were to be further lowered.
Contemporaneously, flight operations
managers at United Airlines came to similar
conclusions as a result of their investigations
at United and other airlines. One accident,
which has since become a classic in the study
of pilot error, galvanized support for a different
type of training for United's pilots. This new
approach to pilot training, now commonly
termed Cockpit Resource Management (CRM),

has been adopted by many airlines in an effort
to further improve airline safety. This paper
explores the foundations of CRM training and
its prospects for success.
CRASH OF UNITED FLIGHT 173
In December, 1978, United Flight 173, a DC-8
aircraft on a scheduled passenger flight from
Denver to Portland, Oregon crashed after the
crew delayed their approach and landing to
work on an unsafe landing gear indication. The
flight was routine until the gear extension was
accompanied by a loud thump, abnormal
vibration, aircraft yaw, and a red warning light
for the right main landing gear. Following
established procedure for this abnormality, the
flight engineer confirmed all main landing gear
were down and locked by a visual inspection
system designed for that purpose.
Some twenty-eight minutes after reporting the
gear problem to Portland air traffic controllers,
the captain contacted United's dispatch and
maintenance center controllers to discuss the
problem. All agreed that the appropriate
procedures had been completed. The
conversation ended approximately 30 minutes
before the aircraft crashed. For the remainder
of the flight, the captain's primary concern
seems to have been to allow the flight
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attendants time to prepare the cabin for an the organizational development firm founded
emergency landing.
by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton. These
During that time, both the first officer and managers were quick to note the similarity in
flight engineer made several oblique and the problems of business management
unassertive references to the increasingly addressed by this training and those involved
critical fuel situation. So oblivious was the in the crash of United 173. Accordingly,
captain to those comments that when the first Scientific Methods was asked to develop a
of four engines quit and the first officer said, similar program for United's pilots (Oberle,
IIWe're losing an·-enginell , the captain asked, -..1990). Although United was not the first airline
IIWhy?1I The crew managed to keep the to implement management training for pilots,
remaining three engines running for another its initial commitment to CRM training was the
seven minutes; the DC-8 crashed six miles greatest, making United the industry leader in
from the runway after the remaining fuel was this area.
exhausted and all engines flamed-out (NTSB, Laboratory Education in Business
1979).
Blake and Mouton were the developers of the
For many, the crash exemplified what was Managerial Grid for assessing leadership styles
wrong with airline pilots and their approach to and were early proponents of laboratory
teamwork in the cockpit. Foushee and education in business. Intensive group
Helmreich (1988) have argued that both experience education, known variously as Ttraditional pilot selection and training are, in group, encounter group, sensitivity training,
part, responsible for these deficiencies. They and laboratory education, was developed and
point out that many airlines have long favored extensively employed in many companies for
the military single-seat fighter pilot for hiring, the two decades following World War II
the type immortalized by Tom Wolfe (1979) as (Kaplan, 1986).
having The right stuff. IIMost of us are familiar
In the earliest stages, managers from different
with the common stereotype of the pilot as a companies or work areas were assembled in
fearless, self-sufficient, technically qualified, training groups but not provided with any
and slightly egotistical individual, whose job specific direction or given any explicit task. The
description calls for the defiance of death on a role of the educator or facilitator was not to
regular basis·· (Foushee and Helmreich, 1988 provide structure but rather to encourage the
p 191). Pilots who have this background and group members to identify and communicate
self-image are unlikely to function well in the their feelings about the group, its work as it
multi-pilot crew when there is a need for evolved, and its members. This feedback was
teamwork and group decision processes. considered the most important product of the
While Foushee and Helmreich may have process (Argyris, 1964). The objective was to
overestimated the extent to which this develop an ability for Ilopenness·1 which the
personality type is evident in airline cockpits, manager could then use on the job. Later
some of the attitudes to which they refer are developments included the use of interactive
common (Helmreich, 1984).
work groups and the introduction of a series of
DEVELOPMENT OF LABORATORY
more structured tasks for the group to perform.
EDUCATION FOR PILOTS
Current methods for the management-team-

At the time of the accident, some United

building aspect of organizational development

managers were participating in a training
program provided by Scientific Methods, Inc.,

are direct results of initial work in laboratory
education (Lewis, 1975). Regardless of the
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teamwork,
(e) understand
the impact of
training method advocated,
scholars
andTraining:
practitioners believed that controlling, external forces on cockpit behavior.
autocratic leadership styles, to the exclusion of
Small teams of pilots work together intensely
relationships within the group, were for three and a half days on a series of
counterproductive (Horstein, Heilman, Mone, projects. This teamwork allows participants to
and Tartell, 1987).
develop skills in inquiry, advocacy, conflict
Laboratory education was intended to solving, decision making, and critiqueing. The
heighten sensitivity to the importance of developers say these skills will not be taught
relationships. -~Underlying .teamwork --values· but will develop through group interaction. At
were the free flow of valid information, a spirit the end of the session, team members
of inquiry, nondefensiveness, and evaluate each other's strengths and
collaboration. These qualities seemed the weaknesses. This sometimes harsh evaluation
perfect prescription for avoiding accidents like by peers is intended to promote reflection and
the Portland crash.
lead to' a change of attitude and behavior.
CRM Training at United Airlines
CRM Training at Other Airlines
The United CRM program uses the
Cockpit resource management training,
Managerial Grid as the basis for examining though not yet required by regulation, has
individual leadership style. The Managerial Grid been introduced in some form at most major
allows for various management styles to be airlines. Many programs are patterned after
depicted on coordinate system where the X United's course and most programs use some
axis measures concern for production or task form of leadership style assessment and group
behavior with the V axis showing concern for feedback.
people or relationship behavior.
EFFICACY
The course introduction states that when the
Despite wide acceptance by the airline
grid is Ilunderstood it provides a comparative industry and ten years experience in CAM
basis for seeing teamwork and how individuals training, there is no conclusive evidence this
contribute to it or prevent it from occurring by training is effective in improving flight safety.
the way in which they interact with one Certainly pilot-error accidents continue to
another-I (Scientific Methods, 1988, p. 3). This occur. Nevertheless, an accident is such a low
emphasis is necessary because Iwell-educated frequency occurrence that a short-term change
and technically proficient crew members . . . in the accident rate will not be statistically
rarely understand what makes people tick. 11 significant in proving the efficacy of training.
(Scientific Methods, 1988, p. 2). Vet the skills in
Some anecdotal evidence, however, has been
working with other crew members are essential offered. United, which had not had a hull-loss
to Ilreaching informed, strategically sound accident since beginning its training program
decisions and taking action accordingly.11 in 1979, suffered two accidents in 1989. One,
(Scientific Methods, 1988, p. 1).
a Boeing 747 on climb out of Honolulu lost a
Objectives of the course are five: (a) gain forward cargo door resulting in serious flight
insight into one's own style of action, (b) set control problems and several passengers
standards for advocacy and inquiry based on being sucked through the gaping hole in the
openness and candor, (c) learn effective use of fuselage.
the captain's authority and crew member
The second occurred when the center engine
leadership, (d) develop principles of synergistic of a DC-1 0 aircraft exploded in flight, resulting
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in severe control problems and a spectacular
televised crash landing at Sioux City, Iowa.
Both captains credited their crews' CRM
training for reducing the loss of life in these
accidents (Langer, 1990). Still, this testimony is
not considered hard statistical evidence and
the vested interest of United Airlines must be
acknowledged.
Helmreich' (1984) . has argued· that CRM
training programs may be effective in changing
pilot attitudes but are unlikely to affect
underlying personalities. Further, there is
evidence that personality is linked to pilot
performance, including cockpit management.
If personality is the predominant determinant of
cockpit management behavior, then airline
managers should concentrate on pilot
selection rather than on training and allow
cockpit management to gradually improve with
the retirement of those pilots with inappropriate
personality traits.
In research at one airline, however, Helmreich
has found that attitudes toward cockpit
management differ significantly by pilot
position, i.e. captain, first officer, second
officer. Because personality traits were not
similarly linked to position, it would seem that
personality traits and attitudes toward cockpit
management are independent. In subsequent
research at the same carrier, a significant
correlation between attitudes and flight deck
performance in cockpit management was
found (Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, and
Russini, 1986).
CRM training has been shown to have a
positive influence on pilot attitudes both as
measured by pilots' subjective evaluation of
the usefulness of the training and by
psychological testing administered pre- and
post- training (Helmreich, Chidester, Foushee,
Gregorich, and Wilhelm, 1989). If CRM training
is effective in changing pilots' attitudes, it
should have a positive effect on actual cockpit
management.
-0-
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Helmreich and his colleagues reported
preliminary results indicating CRM training
does translate to improved cockpit
management behaviors in actual and simulated
flight (Helmreich, Wilhelm, Gregorich, &
Chidester, 1990). The researchers face several
methodological problems. Perhaps the greatest
difficulty is in obtaining consistency of
evaluation from the pilots measuring cockpit
management performance.
Although the degree of efficacy is yet to be
determined, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) (1989), sufficiently convinced that CRM
training will be effective in improving safety,
has proposed such training for all airline pilots.
CRITICISMS
There has been no research on the best
pedagogical methods for CRM training. This
lack of evidence notwithstanding, there are
reasons to question whether programs which
place a heavy emphasis on leadership style
assessment, feedback, and introspection are
likely to be effective in improving airline safety.
These questions involve (a) the underlying
analysis of the causes of pilot error accidents,
(b) the dissimilarity in the working roles of
airline pilots and business managers, and (c)
the history of ineffectiveness of laboratory
training in business.
Questionable Analysis
Though not ignoring other combinations of
task and relationship attitudes and behaviors,
much current CRM thinking stresses the
problem combination of the autocratic, taskoriented captain and the timid, unassertive
subordinate crewmembers as in the case of
the crew of United 173. Thus, much of the
emphasis is on the concern for people or the
relationships dimension of management style.
Data suggests that many pilot-error accidents
involve failures in areas which are the domain
of traditional pilot training programs. In a study
of fatal air carrier accidents worldwide from
1977 through 1988, Sears (1989) found that
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Table 1
The Significant Accident Causes and Their
Percentage of Presence in 93 Major
Accidents

33% Pilot deviated from basic operation
procedures.
26% Inadequate crosscheck by 2nd crew
member.
*9% Crews not conditioned for proper
response during abnormal conditions.
*6% Pilot did not recognize the need for goaround.
4% Pilot incapacitation.
*4% Inadequate piloting skills.
3% Crew errors during training flights.
*3% Pilot not trained to respond promptly to
GPWS command.
*3% Pilot unable to execute safe landing or
go-around when runway sighting is lost
below MDA or DH.
3% Operational procedures did not require
use of available approach aids.
*3% Captain inexperienced in aircraft type.
Source: The Boeing Airliner April/June 1987

*

Factors suggesting a lack of technical knowledge and/or basic
flying skills in the author's opinion.

deviations from standard operating procedures
were a significant factor in thirty-seven percent.
Training and practice of standard operating
procedures for both normal and abnormal
situations constitutes a large portion of
traditional pilot training. In its investigation of
two recent accidents resulting from the failure
of the flight crews to properly set flaps for
takeoff (Northwest at Detroit and Delta at
Dallas), the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB)(1988, 1989) found in both cases
the captains failed to maintain cockpit
discipline and follow standard operating
procedures.
In another study conducted at Boeing Aircraft,
Lautman and Gallimore (1987) found that
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twelve percent of all commercial aircraft
operators accounted for ninety percent of all
accidents. Although the study was not
scientifically based, a series of interviews
showed that standardization and cockpit
discipline was a common element of those
operators with the best safety records.
In an early study, Sears (1986) found a lack of
technical knowledge and/or basic flying skills
to be a contributing factor in approximately
thirty percent of air carrier accidents (Table 1).
These findings suggest that more emphasis
should be placed on task behavior in CAM
training.
Dissimilarity of Pilot and Management Teams
To the extent that the importance of
relationships should also be stressed in CRM
training, there is reason to question whether
group exercises are an effective means of
doing so. Since laboratory education was
designed to address the problems of
openness in management teams and CRM
training draws directly on this foundation,
significant differences between the work of
management and pilot teams may invalidate
assumptions about the transferability of the
training.
Both by tradition and federal law, an airline
captain has absolute authority over the
operation of his/her crew and the aircraft. A
manager has similar responsibilities though
perhaps more limited authority. For most
situations the similarity ends here. For all
normal flying situations, procedures for aircraft
operations are highly developed, specific in
detail, and intended to be precisely followed.
The same is true for all abnormal conditions
which have been anticipated. Traditional pilot
training emphasizes rote learning and
practicing of these procedures. In contrast,
high level management teams operate in a
world of much less certainty, in longer time
horizons, and in environments over which
management has little control.
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Lewis (1975) delineates
the conditions most Effectiveness of Laboratory Training in
favorable for the operation of integrated Business
management teams most likely to benefit from
Laboratory training programs for
team development training. Among those management, which are the basis for many
conditions are: (a) An external environment CRM programs, eventually proved
that is highly variable and/or changing rapidly; disappointing even to their advocates. Chris
(b) an organization which is young and/or Argyris (1979), who championed the cause of
undergoing major change, which results in laboratory education for many years, eventually
fluid structure, - few operating policies and ~ concluded l'there may be factors endemic to
procedures, and emerging role definitions; (c) the theory and practice of the laboratory
technology that is relatively new and/or education that act to inhibit transferabilityll
developing rapidly; and (d) a tendency towards (p.197). Kaplan (1986) concludes that
frequent use of project management, laboratory training failed for two reasons: (a)
temporary task forces, and/or ad hoc problem- Some participants were hurt in the process
solving groups to augment conventional and their working relations damaged, and (b)
organizational structures.
those who felt positive about the process were
These conditions are not characteristic of the generally unable to apply what they had
airline pilot's job, and by extension, team learned in the training. There is evidence that
building may be inappropriate. To the contrary, both of these problems are results of current
Argyris (1964) acknowledges that directive CRM training.
style leadership is appropriate for routine
Although reporting a positive shift in attitudes
decisions and extreme emergencies. These, in by most pilots participating in CRM programs,
fact, are exactly the working conditions faced Helmreich, et al (1989) have found a negative
by airline pilots. A well-known adage among reaction in about fifteen percent of those
pilots characterizes their job lias hours and trained. The data indicate those pilots reacting
hours of boredom interspersed with moments most negatively are low in both task and
of sheer terror .11
relationships on the grid measurement system.
Continuity is an additional significant These are the pilots judged to be most in need
difference between· management teams and of improvement.
airline crews. Whereas management team
While the developers of the United CRM
members can be expected to take some time program deny it, elements of T-group and
to get to know one another, develop working sensitivity training are certainly involved (Public
relationships, and then work together for an Broadcasting System, 1986). During a sales
extended period, it is common for airline pilots presentation of the course to this author, the
to meet for the first time and one hour later to Scientific Methods representative explained
have to function as a highly integrated team with apparent satisfaction how he had
performing a complex task. At larger airlines, it witnessed senior captains and, in one
is also common for a crew to work together for instance, a chief pilot, break down and cry
one month and then possibly never again. before the group during the final evaluation.
As Jack Gordon (1989) sees it, this
Such teamwork can be accomplished only by
adherence to detailed standard operating "personality shredding is a pretty fair
procedures.
description of what went on in some sensitivity
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training sessions, and that at least a few
NEW APPROACHES TO CRM TRAINING
people were seriously wounded" (p.29).
Current approaches of CRM training have
Problems can occur elsewhere even when been questioned by others. John Lauber in his
training does not involve such direct feedback presentation to the Annual Airline Operations
as was characteristic of early sensitivity Forum, Airline Safety in a transitional era
training. Following the breakup of AT&T, (November, 1988), stated his concern that
Pacific Bell instituted a corporate-wide program "some of us have fallen into the dangerous
called Leadership Development. The waters of 'hot tub harmony'. What I mean by
company's director of· training noted that -the - .-this is that I see signs of too much emphasis
program "was a long way from sensitivity on interpersonal relationships in some of the
training" (Gordon, 1989 p. 38). Nonetheless, approaches to cockpit resource management,
following complaints by some employees and and not enough emphasis on command and
an investigation by the California Public Utilities leadership skills. II
Doug Schwartz of
Commission, the program was dropped. These FlightSafety International describes an
results could have been anticipated. In an early evolution from first generation CRM programs,
article advocating T-group training, Argyris which emphasized open ,communication,
(1964) cautions that individuals who are highly teamwork, and advocacy, to training which will
defensive should not be involved in the provide specific and measurable cockpit
training.
behaviors (Hughes, 1989).
The second reason cited by Kaplan for the
The foregoing criticism is not intended to
failure of laboratory education is that even suggest leadership style analysis has no place
when participants had a positive reaction, they in pilot education. In fact, an appreciation of
frequently had difficulty applying what they had the various leadership styles can provide
learned once they returned to the job. Given valuable insights into pilots. Given evidence
this difficulty, positive effects are short-lived. that such attempts have not been successful in
Similar criticisms have been leveled at CRM business settings, and in the absence of
training. Walker and Youngblood (1989) note: explicitly defined behaviors to be used in the
"Some of the existing programs rely heavily on cockpit, the question is what amount of scarce
self-analysis without emphasis on actually training time should be spent in an attempt to
working together or giving skills to use while modify existing pilot attitudes and leadership
working in the cockpit. While self-analysis may styles.
give some personal in-sight into individual
There are other elements of CRM training,
styles of management, it does not deal with some old and some more recently developed,
how to apply skills to working better with other which promise to be effective.
crew members" (p. 56). The difficulty stems Standard Operating Procedures
from an emphasis on attitudes and motivations
First, the importance of strict adherence to
rather than on behaviors. To be effective, existing standard operating procedures must
training programs must identify behaviors be stressed. Case study of accidents,
which are objective, observable, and particularly when video recreations are
measurable (Luthans, Maciag, and available, should be effective. Strong flight
Rosenkrantz, 1983, cited in Kirkpatrick, 1988). operations management support is critical to

Most CRM programs fail to define the cockpit

the development of norms requiring the use of

behaviors that should result from the training
program.

standard procedures.
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Safety Monitor
Procedures can be developed which delegate
the role of safety monitor to the non-flying pilot
who should be responsible for challenging any
deviation from standard procedure in much the
same way that a challenge to a deviation from
a stabilized approach profile is now required.
There are circumstances when deviation from
standard procedure· is .appropriate,. but the
reasons for such a deviation must first be fully
established and explained to the crew. The
safety monitor would also bring to the attention
of the flying pilot information critical to the safe
operation of the aircraft (Bolman. 1979).
Error Chain
Most accidents are the result of a unique
series of events and errors. no one of which
may be uncommon or. in isolation. would lead
to an accident (Sears. 1986). If this lIerror
chainll could be detected and broken while in
progress, accidents could be avoided.
FlightSafety has developed a list of clues
which may point to an error chain in progress
(Table 2) (Schwartz, 1989).
Decision Processes
Although decision making is frequently
mentioned in CRM training. the actual process
is seldom more than superficially explored. It
seems an assumption has been made that if
sufficient openness in the cockpit can be
instilled. good decisions will certainly follow.
Many decisions in aviation are highly
structured and programmable. consequently

Table 2
Error Chain Elements

Ambiguity
Fixation and/or Preoccupation
Confusion or Empty Feeling
No one flying the aircraft
No one looking out window
Use of undocumented procedure
Violating minimums and/or li.mitations
Unresolved discrepancy
Failure to meet targets
Departure from standard operating
procedure
11 . Communication failure

1" •
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1o.

Source: Schwartz (1989)

detailed procedures exist for most mechanical
problems. But pilots also occasionally face
non-programmable decisions which are left to
pilot judgment. The aviation community has
generally felt that pilot judgment is either innate
in good pilots or acquired over time, but were
not a proper subject of formal training (Buch
and Diehl. 1984).
This attitude is in contrast to business
management training which devotes
considerable effort to developing business
judgment. Understanding the classical decision
model and practice in its application to aviation
problems can be effective.

CONCLUSION
CRM is not the only avenue being explored to improve the safety of air travel. The newest
generation of commercial aircraft make extensive use of computers to automate functions which
heretofore required pilot control. Though the introduction of high levels of automation presents
new cockpit management problems (Wiener. 1989). there is reason to believe that these newer
aircraft will be safer. Since pilot error continues to a major contributor to commercial aircraft
accidents. work to improve the human system holds the greatest promise for improving airline
safety. Formal CRM training is more than ten years old and has been adopted by most airlines.
Preliminary research results indicate the training is effective in improving cockpit management
behaviors. There is no research on the relative effectiveness of various approaches to CRM
training, but there are reasons to question whether approaches which emphasize assessment
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol1/iss3/4
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will beMeffective. Until research
results are available, CRM training should de-emphasize the study of leadership styles so that
other promising approaches to training can be included.

Gerald N. Cook, a Boeing 737 captain and
check airman at Midway Airlines in Chicago, IL
recently returned to line flying after six years as
Boeing chief pilot. -With a Master of Science in ",
management and a Bachelor of Science in

aviation technology, both from Purdue
University, Captain Cook is currently pursuing
a Doctorate in Business Administration at Nova
. University, Fort Lauderdale, FL.
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